Sahara India Real Estate ... vs Securities & Exch.Board Of India & ...

Sahara India Real Estate ... vs Securities & Exch.Board Of India & ...

 on 11 September, 2012
Author: …..……………………….......
Bench: S.H. Kapadia, D.K. Jain, Surinder Singh Nijjar, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Jagdish Singh Khehar
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A. Nos. 4-5, 10, 11, 12-13, 16-17, 18, 19, 20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 30-31, 32-33, 34, 35-36, 37-38, 39-40,
41-42, 43-44, 45-46, 47-48, 49- 50, 55-56, 57, 58, 59, 61 and 62
in
C.A. No. 9813 of 2011 and C.A. No. 9833 of 2011
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. & Ors. …Appellants
Vs.
Securities & Exchange Board of India & anr. …Respondents
with
I.A. Nos. 14 and 17 in C.A. No. 733 of 2012
J U D G M E N T
S. H. KAPADIA, CJI
Introduction
1. Finding an acceptable constitutional balance between free press and administration of justice is a difficult
task in every legal system. Factual background
2. Civil Appeal Nos. 9813 and 9833 of 2011 were filed challenging the order dated 18.10.2011 of the
Securities Appellate Tribunal whereby the appellants (hereinafter for short “Sahara”) were directed to
refund amounts invested with the appellants in certain Optionally Fully Convertible Bonds (OFCD) with
interest by a stated date.
3. By order dated 28.11.2011, this Court issued show cause notice to the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), respondent No. 1 herein, directing Sahara to put on affidavit as to how they intend to secure the
liabilities incurred by them to the OFCD holders during the pendency of the Civil Appeals.
4. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 28.11.2011, on 4.01.2012, an affidavit was filed by Sahara explaining
the manner in which it proposed to secure its liability to OFCD holders during the pendency of the Civil
Appeals.
5. On 9.01.2012, both the appeals were admitted for hearing. However, IA No. 3 for interim relief filed by
Sahara was kept for hearing on 20.01.2012.

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Vodafone International Holdings ... vs Union Of India & Anr

Vodafone International Holdings ... vs Union Of India & Anr

 on 20 January, 2012
Author: K Radhakrishnan
Bench: S.H. Kapadia, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.733 OF 2012
(arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26529 of 2010)
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. ... Appellant(s) versus
Union of India & Anr. ...Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T
S.H. KAPADIA, CJI
1. Leave granted.
Introduction
2. This matter concerns a tax dispute involving the Vodafone Group with the Indian Tax Authorities
[hereinafter referred to for short as "the Revenue"], in relation to the acquisition by Vodafone
International Holdings BV [for short "VIH"], a company resident for tax purposes in the
Netherlands, of the entire share capital of CGP Investments 2
(Holdings) Ltd. [for short "CGP"], a company resident for tax purposes in the Cayman Islands
["CI" for short] vide transaction dated 11.02.2007, whose stated aim, according to the Revenue,
was "acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL", being a company resident for tax purposes
in India which is disputed by the appellant saying that VIH agreed to acquire companies which in turn
controlled a 67% interest, but not controlling interest, in Hutchison Essar Limited ("HEL" for
short). According to the appellant, CGP held indirectly through other companies 52% shareholding interest in
HEL as well as Options to acquire a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL, subject to relaxation of FDI
Norms. In short, the Revenue seeks to tax the capital gains arising from the sale of the share capital of CGP on
the basis that CGP, whilst not a tax resident in India, holds the underlying Indian assets.
Facts
A. Evolution of the Hutchison structure and the Transaction
3. The Hutchison Group, Hong Kong (HK) first invested into the telecom business in India in 1992 when the
said 3
Group invested in an Indian joint venture vehicle by the name Hutchison Max Telecom Limited (HMTL) -
later renamed as HEL.
4. On 12.01.1998, CGP stood incorporated in Cayman Islands, with limited liability, as an "exempted
company", its sole shareholder being Hutchison Telecommunications Limited, Hong Kong
["HTL" for short], which in September, 2004 stood transferred to HTI (BVI) Holdings Limited
["HTIHL (BVI)" for short] vide Board Resolution dated 17.09.2004. HTIHL (BVI) was the buyer

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Bhagwan Dass vs State (Nct) Of Delhi

Bhagwan Dass vs State (Nct) Of Delhi

on 9 May, 2011
Author: M Katju
Bench: Markandey Katju, Gyan Sudha Misra
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1117 OF 2011
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.1208 OF 2011 Bhagwan Dass .. Appellant -versus-
State (NCT) of Delhi .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T
Markandey Katju, J.
"Hai maujazan ek kulzum-e-khoon kaash yahi ho Aataa hai abhi dekhiye kya kya mere aage" --
Mirza Ghalib
2
1. This is yet another case of gruesome honour killing, this time by the accused-appellant of his own daughter.
2. Leave granted.
3. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.
4. The prosecution case is that the appellant was very annoyed with his daughter, who had left her husband
Raju and was living in an incestuous relationship with her uncle, Sriniwas. This infuriated the appellant as he
thought this conduct of his daughter Seema had dishonoured his family, and hence he strangulated her with an
electric wire. The trial court convicted the appellant and this judgment was upheld by the High Court. Hence
this appeal.
5. This is a case of circumstantial evidence, but it is settled law that a person can be convicted on
circumstantial evidence 3
provided the links in the chain of circumstances connects the accused with the crime beyond reasonable doubt
vide Vijay Kumar Arora vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 2 SCC 353 (para 16.5), Aftab Ahmad Ansari vs.
State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 2 SCC 583 (vide paragraphs 13 and 14), etc. In this case, we are satisfied that the
prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing all the links in the chain
of circumstances.
6. In cases of circumstantial evidence motive is very important, unlike cases of direct evidence where it is not
so important vide Wakkar and Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 3 SCC 306 (para 14). In the present case,
the prosecution case was that the motive of the appellant in murdering his daughter was that she was living in
adultery with one Sriniwas, who was the son of the maternal aunt of the appellant. The appellant felt
humiliated by this, and to avenge the family honour he murdered his own daughter.

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Ajit Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

Ajit Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

 on 10 March, 2011
Author: . M Sharma
Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, Anil R. Dave
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2011
[Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 12141 of 2008]
Ajit Kumar .... Appellant Versus
State of Jharkhand & Ors. ...Respondents JUDGMENT
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 02.11.2007 passed by the Jharkhand High
Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
3. The appellant herein was working as sub-ordinate Judge in Garhwa, Jharkhand when an order was issued
by the Governor of Jharkhand removing him from service by an order issued on 31.07.2003 on the basis of a
resolution of the Full 1
Court of the High Court of Jharkhand recommending his removal from service.
4. The appellant herein challenged the legality of the aforesaid order before the Jharkhand High Court by
filing a writ petition contending inter alia that the High Court does not have any power to dispense with an
enquiry as envisaged for the purpose of removal of a judicial officer like the appellant and therefore, the
impugned order was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was also submitted that there was no evidence on
record to show that the appellant was guilty of any misconduct and therefore the order of removal was illegal
and particularly also because of the fact that no notice was issued to the appellant before his removal from
service thereby violating the principles of natural justice. It was also submitted that there was a total
non-application of mind in passing the impugned order of removal by exercise of power under proviso (b) to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
5. The aforesaid submissions were considered by the High Court in the light of the material available on
record. The High Court found that the appellant was promoted as sub-ordinate Judge, Garhwa and that on
05.05.2003, the then Inspecting 2
Judge inspected the Garhwa Civil Court and inspected the records relating to the appellant and submitted his
confidential report to the then Chief Justice of the Jharkhand High Court against the appellant stating that the
appellant did not use to prepare judgments on his own, rather he used to get it prepared through some body
else before delivering the judgments. It was also found that the then Chief Justice, after going through the
report, referred the matter to the Full Court for considering the appropriate action. On 18.06.2003, the Full
Court, after considering the confidential report and the report of the Inspecting Judge, resolved that the
appellant can be recommended for removal from the service, without any enquiry as it was felt that it was not
practicable in the interest of the institution to hold an inquiry since it may lead to the question of validity of
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Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr. on 31 January, 2012
Author: G S Singhvi
Bench: Aftab Alam
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1193 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27535 of 2010)
Dr. Subramanian Swamy ... Appellant versus
Dr. Manmohan Singh and another ... Respondents J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, `the 1988 Act') and whether the authority competent to
sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under the 1988 Act is required to take an appropriate
decision within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment
of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the 2
Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
are the question which require consideration in this appeal.
3. For the last more than three years, the appellant has been vigorously pursuing, in public interest, the cases
allegedly involving loss of thousands of crores of rupees to the Public Exchequer due to arbitrary and illegal
grant of licences at the behest of Mr. A. Raja (respondent No. 2) who was appointed as Minister for
Communication and Information Technology on 16.5.2007 by the President on the advice of Dr. Manmohan
Singh (respondent No. 1). After collecting information about the grant of licences, the appellant made detailed
representation dated 29.11.2008 to respondent No. 1 to accord sanction for prosecution of respondent No. 2
for offences under the 1988 Act. In his representation, the appellant pointed out that respondent No. 2 had
allotted new licences in 2G mobile services on `first come, first served' basis to novice telecom companies,
viz., Swan Telecom and Unitech, which was in clear violation of Clause 8 of the Guidelines for United Access
Services Licence issued by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology vide letter
No.10-21/2005-BS.I(Vol.II)/49 dated 14.12.2005 and, 3
thereby, caused loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government. The appellant gave details of the violation
of Clause 8 and pointed out that the two officers, viz., R.J.S. Kushwaha and D. Jha of the Department of
Telecom, who had opposed the showing of undue favour to Swan Telecom, were transferred just before the
grant of licences and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) which had never entered into a roaming
agreement with any operator, was forced to enter into such an agreement with Swan Telecom. The appellant
further pointed out that immediately after acquiring 2G spectrum licences, Swan Telecom and Unitech sold
their stakes to foreign companies, i.e., Etisalat, a telecom operator from UAE and Telenor of Norway
respectively and, thereby, made huge profits at the expense of public revenue. He claimed that by 2G

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Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.

Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.

 on 5 May, 2010
Author: K B I.
Bench: K.G. Balakrishnan, R.V. Raveendran, J.M. Panchal
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004
Smt. Selvi & Ors. ... Appellants Versus
State of Karnataka ...Respondent With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 54 of 2005, 55 of 2005, 56-57 of 2005, 58-59 of 2005, 1199 of 2006, 1471 of 2007, and
Nos.987 & 990 of 2010 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007]
JUDGMENT
K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.
Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007.
1. The legal questions in this batch of criminal appeals relate to the involuntary administration of certain
scientific techniques, namely narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile
(BEAP) test for the 1
purpose of improving investigation efforts in criminal cases. This issue has received considerable attention
since it involves tensions between the desirability of efficient investigation and the preservation of individual
liberties. Ordinarily the judicial task is that of evaluating the rival contentions in order to arrive at a sound
conclusion. However, the present case is not an ordinary dispute between private parties. It raises pertinent
questions about the meaning and scope of fundamental rights which are available to all citizens. Therefore, we
must examine the implications of permitting the use of the impugned techniques in a variety of settings.
2. Objections have been raised in respect of instances where individuals who are the accused, suspects or
witnesses in an investigation have been subjected to these tests without their consent. Such measures have
been defended by citing the importance of extracting information which could help the investigating agencies
to prevent criminal activities in the future as well as in circumstances where it is difficult to gather evidence
through ordinary means. In some of the 2
impugned judgments, reliance has been placed on certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to refer back to the responsibilities placed on citizens to fully co-operate
with investigation agencies. It has also been urged that administering these techniques does not cause any
bodily harm and that the extracted information will be used only for strengthening investigation efforts and
will not be admitted as evidence during the trial stage. The assertion is that improvements in fact-finding
during the investigation stage will consequently help to increase the rate of prosecution as well as the rate of
acquittal. Yet another line of reasoning is that these scientific techniques are a softer alternative to the
regrettable and allegedly widespread use of `third degree methods' by investigators.


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Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner Of

Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner Of ...

on 19 November, 1958

Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 149, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 528

Income-tax-Evasion of taxation-Case referred to Investigation Commission-Commencement of the Constitution- Settlement of case --Constitutional validity of-Waiver of fundamental right, if permissible-Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 Of 1947), s. 8A- Constitution of

India, Art. 14, Part III.

HEADNOTE:

The two questions for determination in this appeal were, (1) whether a settlement under s. 8A of the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 Of 1947) made after the commencement of the Constitution was constitutionally valid and (2) whether the waiver of a fundamental right was permissible under the Constitution. The appellant's case was on July 22, 1948, referred by the Central Government under S. 5(1) of the Act to the Investigation Commission. for investigation and report. The Commission directed the authorised official under s. 6 of the Act to examine the appellant's accounts. He submitted his final report by the end of 1953. The Commission considered the report heard the assessee and came to the conclusion that Rs. 4,47,915 had escaped assessment. Thereupon the appellant on May 20, 1954, applied to the Commission for a settlement of his case under s. 8A of the Act, agreeing to pay Rs. 3,50,000 by way of tax and penalty at the concessional rate. The Commission reported to the Central Government approving of the settlement, the Central Government accepted it and it was recorded by the Commission. The Central Government directed the recovery of the said amount under s. 8A(2) of the Act. The appellant was permitted to make payments by monthly instalments of Rs. 5,000 and the total amount thus paid up to September 8, 1957, aggregated to Rs. 1,28,000. In the meantime the Income Tax Officer issued a certificate and certain properties of the appellant were attached. Relying on the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri,

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 448 and M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247,

the appellant applied to the Commissioner of Income-tax challenging the validity of the settlement made under s. 8A of the Act on the ground that S. 5(1) Of the Act on which it was founded had been declared void by this Court, and claimed that his properties might be released from attachment and the amount paid under the settlement might be refunded to him., On January 29, 1958, the Commissioner of Income Tax sent a reply to the appellant maintaining that the settlement was valid and 529 that the appellant was bound thereunder to pay up the arrears of instalments and requesting him to continue to pay in future. Against this decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax the. appellant came up to the Supreme Court by special leave. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the Act laid down two distinct and separate procedures, one for investigation and the other for settlement and it was the former alone and not the D, latter that was affected by the decisions of this Court. and that the appellant by voluntarily entering into the settlement had waived his fundamental right founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Held (Per Curiam), that both the contentions must fail. It was not correct to say that the Taxation of Income (In- vestigation Commission) Act, 1947, laid down two different procedures, one for investigation and assessment under s. 8(2) of the Act and another for settlement under s. 8A of the Act and assessment in terms of such settlement and that while the decision of this Court in M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Incometax, Madras, declaring s. 5(1) of the Act to be discriminatory and therefore void, affected only the former procedure and not the latter. The Act laid down but one procedure and in entertaining a proposal for settlement as in the investigation itself the Commission exercised the same jurisdiction, and powers and followed the one and the same procedure as laid down by ss. 5, 6 and 7 Of the Act. Since the settlement in the instant case was no exception to that rule, it was covered by the decision and must be held to be violative of Art. 14 Of the Constitution. M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, [1955] 2 S.C.R.

1247, applied. The observations made in the majority judgment of this Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of  Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589, must be kept strictly confined to the special facts of that case and had no application to the facts of the present case. Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589, held inapplicable.

Per Das, C. J., and Kapur J.-There could be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Art. 14 Of the Constitution and it was not correct to contend that the appellant had by entering into the settlement under s. 8A of the Act, waived his fundamental right under that Article. Article 14 was founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued all over the civilised world, its language was the language of command and it imposed an obligation on the State of which no person could, by his act or conduct, relieve it. As it was not strictly necessary for the disposal of this case, the question whether any other fundamental right could be waived need not be considered in this connection. Laxamanappa Hanumantappa jamkhandi v. The Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 769; Dewan-Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Moht 67 530 v. The Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R.773; Baburao Narayanrao Sanas v. The Union Of India, [1954] 26 I.T.R. 725; Subedar v. State, A.I.R. 1957 All. 396 and Pakhar Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 294, distinguished and held inapplicable.

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