Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts

Tuesday 12 February 2013

Reviewing regulations in the sugar sector


Reviewing regulations in the sugar sector


There have been some recent developments in the sugar sector, which pertain to the pricing of sugarcane and deregulation of the sector. On January 31, the Cabinet approved the fair and remunerative price (FRP) of sugarcane for the 2013-14 season at Rs 210 per quintal, a 23.5% increase from last year’s FRP of Rs 170 per quintal. The FRP of sugarcane is the minimum price set by the centre and is payable by mills to sugarcane farmers throughout the country. However, states can also set a State Advised Price (SAP) that mills would have to pay farmers instead of the FRP.
In addition, a recent news report mentioned that the food ministry has decided to seek Cabinet approval to lift controls on sugar, particularly relating to levy sugar and the regulated release of non-levy sugar.
The Rangarajan Committee report, published in October 2012, highlighted challenges in the pricing policy for sugarcane. The Committee recommended deregulating the sugar sector with respect to pricing and levy sugar.
In this blog, we discuss the current regulations related to the sugar sector and key recommendations for deregulation suggested by the Rangarajan Committee.
Current regulations in the sugar sector
A major step to liberate the sugar sector from controls was taken in 1998 when the licensing requirement for new sugar mills was abolished. Delicensing caused the sugar sector to grow at almost 7% annually during 1998-99 and 2011-12 compared to 3.3% annually during 1990-91 and 1997-98.
Although delicensing removed some regulations in the sector, others still persist. For instance, every designated mill is obligated to purchase sugarcane from farmers within a specified cane reservation area, and conversely, farmers are bound to sell to the mill. Also, the central government has prescribed a minimum radial distance of 15 km between any two sugar mills.
However, the Committee found that existing regulations were stunting the growth of the industry and recommended that the sector be deregulated. It was of the opinion that deregulation would enable the industry to leverage the expanding opportunities created by the rising demand of sugar and sugarcane as a source of renewable energy.
Rangarajan Committee’s recommendations on deregulation of the sugar sector
Price of sugarcane: The central government fixes a minimum price, the FRP that is paid by mills to farmers. States can also intervene in sugarcane pricing with an SAP to strengthen farmer’s interests. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have set SAPs for the past few years, which have been higher than FRPs.
The Committee recommended that states should not declare an SAP because it imposes an additional cost on mills. Farmers should be paid a uniform FRP. It suggested determining cane prices according to scientifically sound and economically fair principles. The Committee also felt that high SAPs, combined with other controls in the sector, would deter private investment in the sugar industry.
Levy sugar: Every sugar mill mandatorily surrenders 10% of its production to the central government at a price lower than the market price – this is known as levy sugar. This enables the central government to get access to low cost sugar stocks for distribution through the Public Distribution System (PDS). At present prices, the centre saves about Rs 3,000 crore on account of this policy, the burden of which is borne by the sugar sector.
The Committee recommended doing away with levy sugar. States wanting to provide sugar under PDS would have to procure it directly from the market.
Regulated release of non-levy sugar: The central government allows the release of non-levy sugar into the market on a periodic basis. Currently, release orders are given on a quarterly basis. Thus, sugar produced over the four-to-six month sugar season is sold throughout the year by distributing the release of stock evenly across the year. The regulated release of sugar imposes costs directly on mills (and hence indirectly on farmers). Mills can neither take advantage of high prices to sell the maximum possible stock, nor dispose of their stock to raise cash for meeting various obligations. This adversely impacts the ability of mills to pay sugarcane farmers in time.
The Committee recommended removing the regulations on release of non-levy sugar to address these problems.
Trade policy: The government has set controls on both export and import of sugar that fluctuate depending on the domestic availability, demand and price of sugarcane. As a result, India’s trade in the world trade of sugar is small. Even though India contributes 17% to global sugar production (second largest producer in the world), its share in exports is only 4%. This has been at the cost of considerable instability for the sugar cane industry and its production.
The committee recommended removing existing restrictions on trade in sugar and converting them into tariffs.

Tuesday 6 November 2012

SEVEN LAMPS OF ADVOCACY

Seven Lamps of Advocacy
Advocacy is an honourable profession. Advocates are part and parcel of Court. Their efforts solve the conflicts in the society. Advocates defend the rights and liabilities. They hold unique place in the society. Advocacy is not a craft but a calling; a profession wherein devotion to duty constitutes the hallmark.
Legal profession is regarded to be a noble one. A good advocate should possess some essential qualities and equipment. Judge Abbot parry in his book “The Seven Lamps of Advocacy” called these important characteristics of advocacy as “seven lamps of advocacy” and listed them as honesty, courage, industry, wit, eloquence, judgment and fellowship.
1)     Honesty
Honesty means the quality of straightforwardness; freedom from deceit, cheating or stealing and not telling lies. The best advocates of all generations have been devotees of honesty. Example for honest character is Abraham Lincoln, who founded his fame and success on what some called ‘preserve honesty’. The nobleness of legal profession lies in honesty itself. An advocate should not do illegal practices. He should not do any act which will lead to professional misconduct. He should disclose the real facts and legal profession to his clients frankly. Honesty, integrity and character are inseparable. These there virtues together are essential for the success of an advocate. The great sages of law had sucked the law from the breasts of knowledge, honesty, gravity and integrity.
2)     Courage
Courage is the quality that enables a person to control fear in the face of danger, pain, misfortune, etc.; an advocate must possess courage. He should face the pressures from outside with courage. Sometimes he has to fight against State. He should not fear about the executive and politicians. He must perform his duty to safeguard the interests of his client. Advocacy is a form of combat, where courage in times of danger is half won battle. Courage is as good a weapon in the forum as in the war camp, According to Charles Hutton’s. ‘He hath in perfection the three chief qualifications of an advocate; Boldness, -- Boldness and Boldness’.
3)     Industry
Advocacy is needed a life of industry. An advocate must study his brief in the same way that an actor studies his part. Success in advocacy is not arrived at by intuition but through industry. Industry is the quality of being hard-working; being always employed usefully. Lord Eldon Says, “An advocate must live like a hermit and work like a horse”. Advocacy is an intellectual profession. Intelligence and knowledge will be sharpened with hard-work and strenuous efforts. Advocacy is the profession which requires ‘Study’ and ‘Study’ throughout the career. An advocate must know about every trade. He must acquire the knowledge of every field. He must learn about all professions. Industry brings a good fame and name to an advocate. Law changes day-to-day. To acquire up to date knowledge an advocate must refer international and national journals, reference books of his library and the bar library. He has to work hard like a spider to the benefit of his client.
4)     Wit
Wit means clever and humorous expression of ideas; liveliness of spirit. Wit flows from intelligence; understanding and quickness of mind. Wit lessens the work load of an advocate. It relaxes his mental strain. Often the wit of an advocate will turn a Judge
from an unwise course, where Judgment, or rhetoric would certainly fail. The lamp of wit is needed to lighten the darkness of advocacy.
5)     Eloquence
The success of an advocate depends upon his eloquence. Eloquence means fluent speaking and skilful use of language to persuade or to appeal to the feelings of others. Fluent speaking impresses the listener. As advocate must be fluent, skilful in using appropriate words to impress the Court. Eloquence attracts the attention of the listener. Eloquence is related to the art of oratory. ‘Eloquence of manner is real eloquence’ and there is a physical as well as psychological side to advocacy.
6)     Judgment
Judgment is an intellectual capacity, ‘the inspiration which enables a man to translate good sense into right action’. In judgment one has to estimate, consider and form an opinion about the issues with good sense and ability. An advocate could be in a position to judge the merits and demerits of the case on hearing the brief and seeing the document. He should inform his client the legal position openly after judging the issues. Here judgment is not ‘giving the decision of the case by the Judge in the Court’. Judgment means the study of the case in deep by considering all shades of the consequences. In nothing does the lawyer more openly exhibit want of Judgment than
in prolixity. Judge Abbot Parry has referred to judgment as one of the seven lamps; but he refers to it essentially as an intellectual capacity, ‘the inspiration’ which enables a mean to translate good sense into right action e.g. ‘seeing the right point of his case’ and the like.
7)     Fellowship
Fellowship means the membership in friendly association or companionship. Fellowship is exactly like great public schools, the boys of which have grown older, and have exchanged boyish for manly objects. Though the advocates are opponent parties before the bench but not enemies with each other. Their conflict ends as they come out of the door steps of the Court. Daniel Webster says, “Lawyers on opposite sides of a case are like the two parts of shears, they cut what comes between them, but not each other”. There is no discrimination of age, ability, experience and riches etc. between the advocates. All are equal. Courts give them all equal respect. Among advocates, there is just the same rough familiarly, the general ardour of character, the same kind of public opinion expressed in exactly the same blunt, unmistakable manner. By keeping the lump of fellowship burning, advocates encourage each other by sharing the knowledge to walk in the light of the seven lamps of advocacy.
(7+1) Tact K.V.Krishnaswamy Aiyer, in his book “Professional Conduct and Advocacy” adds one more lamp i.e. tact. Tact means handling people and situations skilfully and without causing offence. An advocate must be in a position to tackle and win his client, opponent party, opponent advocate in a smoother way. Many people of unequal ability have failed for want of tack. An advocate should not quarrel with Court or loose temper over trifle things in the Court and outside. Men of unquestioned ability have suffered for quarrelling with the tribunal or for standing on their dignity over trifles, for getting their clients, or for losing their tempers; they are men of parts but more properly refers to the human side of putting into action the result of one’s judgment.

Sunday 23 September 2012

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr



Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr. on 31 January, 2012
Author: G S Singhvi
Bench: Aftab Alam
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1193 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27535 of 2010)
Dr. Subramanian Swamy ... Appellant versus
Dr. Manmohan Singh and another ... Respondents J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, `the 1988 Act') and whether the authority competent to
sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under the 1988 Act is required to take an appropriate
decision within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment
of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the 2
Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
are the question which require consideration in this appeal.
3. For the last more than three years, the appellant has been vigorously pursuing, in public interest, the cases
allegedly involving loss of thousands of crores of rupees to the Public Exchequer due to arbitrary and illegal
grant of licences at the behest of Mr. A. Raja (respondent No. 2) who was appointed as Minister for
Communication and Information Technology on 16.5.2007 by the President on the advice of Dr. Manmohan
Singh (respondent No. 1). After collecting information about the grant of licences, the appellant made detailed
representation dated 29.11.2008 to respondent No. 1 to accord sanction for prosecution of respondent No. 2
for offences under the 1988 Act. In his representation, the appellant pointed out that respondent No. 2 had
allotted new licences in 2G mobile services on `first come, first served' basis to novice telecom companies,
viz., Swan Telecom and Unitech, which was in clear violation of Clause 8 of the Guidelines for United Access
Services Licence issued by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology vide letter
No.10-21/2005-BS.I(Vol.II)/49 dated 14.12.2005 and, 3
thereby, caused loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government. The appellant gave details of the violation
of Clause 8 and pointed out that the two officers, viz., R.J.S. Kushwaha and D. Jha of the Department of
Telecom, who had opposed the showing of undue favour to Swan Telecom, were transferred just before the
grant of licences and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) which had never entered into a roaming
agreement with any operator, was forced to enter into such an agreement with Swan Telecom. The appellant
further pointed out that immediately after acquiring 2G spectrum licences, Swan Telecom and Unitech sold
their stakes to foreign companies, i.e., Etisalat, a telecom operator from UAE and Telenor of Norway
respectively and, thereby, made huge profits at the expense of public revenue. He claimed that by 2G

FOR MORE CLICK Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr

Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.


Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.


 on 5 May, 2010
Author: K B I.
Bench: K.G. Balakrishnan, R.V. Raveendran, J.M. Panchal
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004
Smt. Selvi & Ors. ... Appellants Versus
State of Karnataka ...Respondent With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 54 of 2005, 55 of 2005, 56-57 of 2005, 58-59 of 2005, 1199 of 2006, 1471 of 2007, and
Nos.987 & 990 of 2010 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007]
JUDGMENT
K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.
Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007.
1. The legal questions in this batch of criminal appeals relate to the involuntary administration of certain
scientific techniques, namely narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile
(BEAP) test for the 1
purpose of improving investigation efforts in criminal cases. This issue has received considerable attention
since it involves tensions between the desirability of efficient investigation and the preservation of individual
liberties. Ordinarily the judicial task is that of evaluating the rival contentions in order to arrive at a sound
conclusion. However, the present case is not an ordinary dispute between private parties. It raises pertinent
questions about the meaning and scope of fundamental rights which are available to all citizens. Therefore, we
must examine the implications of permitting the use of the impugned techniques in a variety of settings.
2. Objections have been raised in respect of instances where individuals who are the accused, suspects or
witnesses in an investigation have been subjected to these tests without their consent. Such measures have
been defended by citing the importance of extracting information which could help the investigating agencies
to prevent criminal activities in the future as well as in circumstances where it is difficult to gather evidence
through ordinary means. In some of the 2
impugned judgments, reliance has been placed on certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to refer back to the responsibilities placed on citizens to fully co-operate
with investigation agencies. It has also been urged that administering these techniques does not cause any
bodily harm and that the extracted information will be used only for strengthening investigation efforts and
will not be admitted as evidence during the trial stage. The assertion is that improvements in fact-finding
during the investigation stage will consequently help to increase the rate of prosecution as well as the rate of
acquittal. Yet another line of reasoning is that these scientific techniques are a softer alternative to the
regrettable and allegedly widespread use of `third degree methods' by investigators.


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Thursday 6 September 2012

Sunday 2 September 2012

CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

On the 28th of January, 1950, two days after India became a Sovereign Democratic Republic, the Supreme Court came into being. The inauguration took place in the Chamber of Princes in the Parliament building which also housed India's Parliament, consisting of the Council of States and the House of the People. It was here, in this Chamber of Princes, that the Federal Court of India had sat for 12 years between 1937 and 1950. This was to be the home of the Supreme Court for years that were to follow until the Supreme Court acquired its own present premises.
The inaugural proceedings were simple but impressive. They began at 9.45 a.m. when the Judges of the Federal Court - Chief Justice Harilal J.Kania and Justices Saiyid Fazl Ali, M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Bijan Kumar Mukherjea and S.R.Das - took their seats. In attendance were the Chief Justices of the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Madras, Orissa, Assam, Nagpur, Punjab, Saurashtra, Patiala and the East Punjab States Union, Mysore, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat and Travancore-Cochin. Along with the Attorney General for India, M.C. Setalvad were present the Advocate Generals of Bombay, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, East Punjab, Orissa, Mysore, Hyderabad and Madhya Bharat. Present too, were Prime Minister, other Ministers, Ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of foreign States, a large number of Senior and other Advocates of the Court and other distinguished visitors.
Taking care to ensure that the Rules of the Supreme Court were published and the names of all the Advocates and agents of the Federal Court were brought on the rolls of the Supreme Court, the inaugural proceedings were over and put under part of the record of the Supreme Court.
After its inauguration on January 28, 1950, the Supreme Court commenced its sittings in a part of the Parliament House. The Court moved into the present building in 1958. The building is shaped to project the image of scales of justice. The Central Wing of the building is the Centre Beam of the Scales. In 1979, two New Wings - the East Wing and the West Wing - were added to the complex. In all there are 15 Court Rooms in the various wings of the building. The Chief Justice's Court is the largest of the Courts located in the Centre of the Central Wing.
The original Constitution of 1950 envisaged a Supreme Court with a Chief Justice and 7 puisne Judges - leaving it to Parliament to increase this number. In the early years, all the Judges of the Supreme Court sat together to hear the cases presented before them. As the work of the Court increased and arrears of cases began to cumulate, Parliament increased the number of Judges from 8 in 1950 to 11 in 1956, 14 in 1960, 18 in 1978 and 26 in 1986. As the number of the Judges has increased, they sit in smaller Benches of two and three - coming together in larger Benches of 5 and more only when required to do so or to settle a difference of opinion or controversy.
The Supreme Court of India comprises the Chief Justice and not more than 25 other Judges appointed by the President of India. Supreme Court Judges retire upon attaining the age of 65 years. In order to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court, a person must be a citizen of India and must have been, for atleast five years, a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession, or an Advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession for at least 10 years or he must be, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. Provisions exist for the appointment of a Judge of a High Court as an Ad-hoc Judge of the Supreme Court and for retired Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts to sit and act as Judges of that Court.



INDIAN JUDICIARY

INDIAN JUDICIARY


JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction. Its exclusive original jurisdiction extends to any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States or between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the other or between two or more States, if and insofar as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or of fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. In addition, Article 32 of the Constitution gives an extensive original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in regard to enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari to enforce them. The Supreme Court has been conferred with power to direct transfer of any civil or criminal case from one State High Court to another State High Court or from a Court subordinate to another State High Court. The Supreme Court, if satisfied that cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before it and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and that such questions are substantial questions of general importance, may withdraw a case or cases pending before the High Court or High Courts and dispose of all such cases itself. Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, International Commercial Arbitration can also be initiated in the Supreme Court. 

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked by a certificate granted by the High Court concerned under Article 132(1), 133(1) or 134 of the Constitution in respect of any judgement, decree or final order of a High Court in both civil and criminal cases, involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court in civil matters if the High Court concerned certifies : (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance, and (b) that, in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In criminal cases, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court if the High Court (a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than 10 years, or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than 10 years, or (c) certified that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Parliament is authorised to confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgement, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court.
The Supreme Court has also a very wide appellate jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals in India in as much as it may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India.
The Supreme Court has special advisory jurisdiction in matters which may specifically be referred to it by the President of India under Article 143 of the Constitution. There are provisions for reference or appeal to this Court under Article 317(1) of the Constitution, Section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 7(2) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Section 130-A of the Customs Act, 1962, Section 35-H of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Section 82C of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Advocates Act, 1961, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Customs Act, 1962, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970, Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Election Petitions under Part III of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Act, 1952 are also filed directly in the Supreme Court.
Under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has been vested with power to punish for contempt of Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. In case of contempt other than the contempt referred to in Rule 2, Part-I of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, the Court may take action (a) Suo motu, or (b) on a petition made by Attorney General, or Solicitor General, or (c) on a petition made by any person, and in the case of a criminal contempt with the consent in writing of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.
Under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules the Supreme Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review is to be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

FOR MORE CONTENT CLICK ON INDIAN JUDICIARY

Copyright Act 1957


Copyright Act 1957

2.Interpretation:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "adapatation" means,-

( i ) in relation to a dramatic work, the conversion of the work into a non-dramatic work;
( ii ) in relation to a literary work or an artistic work, the conversion of the work into a dramatic work by way of performance in public or otherwise;
( iii ) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, any abridgement of the work or any version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed wholly or mainly by means of pictures in a form suitable for reproduction in a book, or in a newspaper, magazine or similar per` iodical; and
( iv ) in relation to a musical work, any arrangement or transcription of the work;
(b) "architectural work of art" means any building or structure having an artistic character or design, or any model for such building or structure;
(c) "artistic work" means---
( i ) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality;

(ii) an architectural work of art; and
( iii ) any other work of artistic craftsmanship;
(d) "author" means,-
( i ) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the author of the work;
( ii ) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
( iii ) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the artist;
( iv ) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph;
( v ) in relation to a cinematograph film, the owner of the film at the time of its completion; and
( vi ) in relation to a record, the owner of the original plate from which the record is made, at the time of the making of the plate;
(e) "calendar year" means the year commencing on the 1st day of January;
(f) "cinematograph film" includes the sound track, if any, and "cinematograph" shall be construed as including any work produced by any mechanical instrument or by radio-diffusion

For more detail please click on Copyright Act 1957

Monday 27 August 2012

THE UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION ACT, 1956


THE
UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION
ACT, 1956

An Act to make provision for the co-ordination and determination of
standards in Universities and for that purpose, to establish a
University Grants Commission.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Republic of India
as follows:-
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY
1. (1) This Act may be called the University Grants
Comission Act, 1956.
(2) It shall come into force on such date1 as the
Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) “Commission” means the University Grants
Commission established under section 4;
(b) “executive authority” in relation to a University,
means the chief executive authority of the
University (by whatever name called) in which
the general administration of the University is
vested;
(c) “Fund” means the Fund of the University Grants
Commission constituted under section 16;
(d) “member’ means a member of the University
Grants Commission and includes the Chairman2
(and Vice-Chairman];
(e) “prescribed’ means prescribed by rules made
under this Act;
Short title and
commencement




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210th Report on Humanisation and Decriminalisation of Attempt to Suicide


210th Report on Humanisation and Decriminalisation of Attempt to Suicide


Dear Dr. Bhardwaj ji,

Sub: Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt to Suicide.


I have great pleasure in submitting herewith the 210th Report of
the Law Commission of India on the above subject.
In our country, attempt to suicide is an offence punishable
under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 309 reads thus:
Attempt to commit suicide. “Whoever attempts to commit
suicide and does any act towards the commission of such
offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.”
Article 21 of the Constitution of India enjoins that no person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.
A Division Bench of the Supreme Court in P. Rathinam v.
Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 1844) held that the right to live of
which Article 21 speaks of can be said to bring in its trail the right not
to live a forced life, and therefore, section 309 violates Article 21.
This decision was, however, subsequently overruled in Gian Kaur v.
State of Punjab (AIR 1996 SC 946) by a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court, holding that Article 21 cannot be construed to include
within it the ‘right to die’ as a part of the fundamental right
guaranteed therein, and therefore, it cannot be said that section 309 is
violative of Article 21.
The Law Commission had undertaken revision of the Indian
Penal Code as part of its function of revising Central Acts of general
application and importance. In its 42nd Report submitted in 1971, the
6
Commission recommended, inter alia, repeal of section 309. The
Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1978, as passed by the Rajya
Sabha, accordingly provided for omission of section 309.
Unfortunately, before it could be passed by the Lok Sabha, the Lok
Sabha was dissolved and the Bill lapsed. The Commission submitted
its 156th Report in 1997 after the pronouncement of the judgement in
Gian Kaur, recommending retention of section 309.


FOR MORE OF THIS REPORTS PLEASE CLICK 210th Report on Humanisation and Decriminalisation of Attempt to Suicide

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908


THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908


An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature.
WHEREAS it is expedient to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature; it is hereby enacted as follows:-
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, commencement and extent- (1) This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(2) It shall come into force on the first day of January, 1909.
[2][(3) It extends to the whole of India except-
(a) the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) the State of Nagaland and the tribal areas :
Provided that the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Code or any of them to the whole or part of the State of Nagaland or such tribal areas, as the case may be, with such supplemental, incidental or consequential modifications as may be specified in the notification.
Explanation-In this clause, "tribal areas" means the territories which, immediately before the 21st day of January, 1972 were included in the tribal areas of Assam as referred to in paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.
(4) In relation to the Amindivi Islands, and the East Godavari, West Godavari and Visakhapatnam Agencies in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Union territory of Lakshadweep, the application of this Code shall be without prejudice to the application of any rule or regulation for the time being in force in such Islands, Agencies or such Union territory, as the case may be, relating to the application of this Code.]



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THE ADVOCATES ACT,1961



THE ADVOCATES ACT,1961




STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Bill seeks to implement the recommendations of the All India Bar Committee made in 1953, after taking into account the recommendations of the Law Commission on the subject of Reform of Judicial Administration in so far as the recommendations relate to the Bar and to legal education.
The main features of the Bill are, -
(1) The establishment of an All India Bar Council and a common roll of advocates, and advocate on the common roll having a right to practice in any part of the country and in any Court, including the Supreme Court;
2. The integration of the bar into a single class of legal practitioners know as advocates;
3. The prescription of a uniform qualification for the admission of persons to be advocates;
4. The division of advocates into senior advocates and other advocates based on merit;
5. The creation of autonomous Bar Councils, one for the whole of India and on for each State.
Following the recommendations of the All India Bar Committee and the Law Commission, the Bill recognised the continued existence of the system known as the dual system now prevailing in the High Court of Calcutta and Bombay, by making suitable provisions in that behalf: It would, however, be open to t he two High Courts, if they so desire, to discontinue this system at any time.

THE ADVOCATES ACT,1961

Indian Penal Code 1860


Indian Penal Code 1860



Title and extent of operation of the Code.-- This Act shall be called the Indian Penal Code, and shall 3[ extend to the whole of India 4[ except the State of Jammu and Kashmir]].
2. Punishment of offences committed within India.-- Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within 5[ India] 6[ .
3. Punishment of offences committed beyond, but which by law may be tried within, India.-- Any person liable, by any 7[ Indian law], to be tried for an offence committed beyond 5[ India] shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond 5[ India] in the same manner as if such act had been committed within 5[ India].

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Indian Contract Act, 1872

Indian Contract Act, 1872


This Act may be called be the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Extent, commencement - It extends to the whole of except the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and it shall come into force on the first day of September, 1872.
Enactment repealed - [***] Nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any Statute, Act or Regulation not hereby expressly repealed, nor any usage or customs of trade, nor any incident of any contract, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 


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