Sahara India Real Estate ... vs Securities & Exch.Board Of India & ...

Sahara India Real Estate ... vs Securities & Exch.Board Of India & ...

 on 11 September, 2012
Author: …..……………………….......
Bench: S.H. Kapadia, D.K. Jain, Surinder Singh Nijjar, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Jagdish Singh Khehar
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A. Nos. 4-5, 10, 11, 12-13, 16-17, 18, 19, 20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 30-31, 32-33, 34, 35-36, 37-38, 39-40,
41-42, 43-44, 45-46, 47-48, 49- 50, 55-56, 57, 58, 59, 61 and 62
in
C.A. No. 9813 of 2011 and C.A. No. 9833 of 2011
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. & Ors. …Appellants
Vs.
Securities & Exchange Board of India & anr. …Respondents
with
I.A. Nos. 14 and 17 in C.A. No. 733 of 2012
J U D G M E N T
S. H. KAPADIA, CJI
Introduction
1. Finding an acceptable constitutional balance between free press and administration of justice is a difficult
task in every legal system. Factual background
2. Civil Appeal Nos. 9813 and 9833 of 2011 were filed challenging the order dated 18.10.2011 of the
Securities Appellate Tribunal whereby the appellants (hereinafter for short “Sahara”) were directed to
refund amounts invested with the appellants in certain Optionally Fully Convertible Bonds (OFCD) with
interest by a stated date.
3. By order dated 28.11.2011, this Court issued show cause notice to the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), respondent No. 1 herein, directing Sahara to put on affidavit as to how they intend to secure the
liabilities incurred by them to the OFCD holders during the pendency of the Civil Appeals.
4. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 28.11.2011, on 4.01.2012, an affidavit was filed by Sahara explaining
the manner in which it proposed to secure its liability to OFCD holders during the pendency of the Civil
Appeals.
5. On 9.01.2012, both the appeals were admitted for hearing. However, IA No. 3 for interim relief filed by
Sahara was kept for hearing on 20.01.2012.

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Vodafone International Holdings ... vs Union Of India & Anr

Vodafone International Holdings ... vs Union Of India & Anr

 on 20 January, 2012
Author: K Radhakrishnan
Bench: S.H. Kapadia, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.733 OF 2012
(arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26529 of 2010)
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. ... Appellant(s) versus
Union of India & Anr. ...Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T
S.H. KAPADIA, CJI
1. Leave granted.
Introduction
2. This matter concerns a tax dispute involving the Vodafone Group with the Indian Tax Authorities
[hereinafter referred to for short as "the Revenue"], in relation to the acquisition by Vodafone
International Holdings BV [for short "VIH"], a company resident for tax purposes in the
Netherlands, of the entire share capital of CGP Investments 2
(Holdings) Ltd. [for short "CGP"], a company resident for tax purposes in the Cayman Islands
["CI" for short] vide transaction dated 11.02.2007, whose stated aim, according to the Revenue,
was "acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL", being a company resident for tax purposes
in India which is disputed by the appellant saying that VIH agreed to acquire companies which in turn
controlled a 67% interest, but not controlling interest, in Hutchison Essar Limited ("HEL" for
short). According to the appellant, CGP held indirectly through other companies 52% shareholding interest in
HEL as well as Options to acquire a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL, subject to relaxation of FDI
Norms. In short, the Revenue seeks to tax the capital gains arising from the sale of the share capital of CGP on
the basis that CGP, whilst not a tax resident in India, holds the underlying Indian assets.
Facts
A. Evolution of the Hutchison structure and the Transaction
3. The Hutchison Group, Hong Kong (HK) first invested into the telecom business in India in 1992 when the
said 3
Group invested in an Indian joint venture vehicle by the name Hutchison Max Telecom Limited (HMTL) -
later renamed as HEL.
4. On 12.01.1998, CGP stood incorporated in Cayman Islands, with limited liability, as an "exempted
company", its sole shareholder being Hutchison Telecommunications Limited, Hong Kong
["HTL" for short], which in September, 2004 stood transferred to HTI (BVI) Holdings Limited
["HTIHL (BVI)" for short] vide Board Resolution dated 17.09.2004. HTIHL (BVI) was the buyer

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Bhagwan Dass vs State (Nct) Of Delhi

Bhagwan Dass vs State (Nct) Of Delhi

on 9 May, 2011
Author: M Katju
Bench: Markandey Katju, Gyan Sudha Misra
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1117 OF 2011
@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.1208 OF 2011 Bhagwan Dass .. Appellant -versus-
State (NCT) of Delhi .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T
Markandey Katju, J.
"Hai maujazan ek kulzum-e-khoon kaash yahi ho Aataa hai abhi dekhiye kya kya mere aage" --
Mirza Ghalib
2
1. This is yet another case of gruesome honour killing, this time by the accused-appellant of his own daughter.
2. Leave granted.
3. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.
4. The prosecution case is that the appellant was very annoyed with his daughter, who had left her husband
Raju and was living in an incestuous relationship with her uncle, Sriniwas. This infuriated the appellant as he
thought this conduct of his daughter Seema had dishonoured his family, and hence he strangulated her with an
electric wire. The trial court convicted the appellant and this judgment was upheld by the High Court. Hence
this appeal.
5. This is a case of circumstantial evidence, but it is settled law that a person can be convicted on
circumstantial evidence 3
provided the links in the chain of circumstances connects the accused with the crime beyond reasonable doubt
vide Vijay Kumar Arora vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 2 SCC 353 (para 16.5), Aftab Ahmad Ansari vs.
State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 2 SCC 583 (vide paragraphs 13 and 14), etc. In this case, we are satisfied that the
prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing all the links in the chain
of circumstances.
6. In cases of circumstantial evidence motive is very important, unlike cases of direct evidence where it is not
so important vide Wakkar and Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 3 SCC 306 (para 14). In the present case,
the prosecution case was that the motive of the appellant in murdering his daughter was that she was living in
adultery with one Sriniwas, who was the son of the maternal aunt of the appellant. The appellant felt
humiliated by this, and to avenge the family honour he murdered his own daughter.

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Ajit Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

Ajit Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

 on 10 March, 2011
Author: . M Sharma
Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, Anil R. Dave
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2011
[Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 12141 of 2008]
Ajit Kumar .... Appellant Versus
State of Jharkhand & Ors. ...Respondents JUDGMENT
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 02.11.2007 passed by the Jharkhand High
Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
3. The appellant herein was working as sub-ordinate Judge in Garhwa, Jharkhand when an order was issued
by the Governor of Jharkhand removing him from service by an order issued on 31.07.2003 on the basis of a
resolution of the Full 1
Court of the High Court of Jharkhand recommending his removal from service.
4. The appellant herein challenged the legality of the aforesaid order before the Jharkhand High Court by
filing a writ petition contending inter alia that the High Court does not have any power to dispense with an
enquiry as envisaged for the purpose of removal of a judicial officer like the appellant and therefore, the
impugned order was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was also submitted that there was no evidence on
record to show that the appellant was guilty of any misconduct and therefore the order of removal was illegal
and particularly also because of the fact that no notice was issued to the appellant before his removal from
service thereby violating the principles of natural justice. It was also submitted that there was a total
non-application of mind in passing the impugned order of removal by exercise of power under proviso (b) to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
5. The aforesaid submissions were considered by the High Court in the light of the material available on
record. The High Court found that the appellant was promoted as sub-ordinate Judge, Garhwa and that on
05.05.2003, the then Inspecting 2
Judge inspected the Garhwa Civil Court and inspected the records relating to the appellant and submitted his
confidential report to the then Chief Justice of the Jharkhand High Court against the appellant stating that the
appellant did not use to prepare judgments on his own, rather he used to get it prepared through some body
else before delivering the judgments. It was also found that the then Chief Justice, after going through the
report, referred the matter to the Full Court for considering the appropriate action. On 18.06.2003, the Full
Court, after considering the confidential report and the report of the Inspecting Judge, resolved that the
appellant can be recommended for removal from the service, without any enquiry as it was felt that it was not
practicable in the interest of the institution to hold an inquiry since it may lead to the question of validity of
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Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr

Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh And Anr. on 31 January, 2012
Author: G S Singhvi
Bench: Aftab Alam
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1193 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27535 of 2010)
Dr. Subramanian Swamy ... Appellant versus
Dr. Manmohan Singh and another ... Respondents J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, `the 1988 Act') and whether the authority competent to
sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under the 1988 Act is required to take an appropriate
decision within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment
of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the 2
Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
are the question which require consideration in this appeal.
3. For the last more than three years, the appellant has been vigorously pursuing, in public interest, the cases
allegedly involving loss of thousands of crores of rupees to the Public Exchequer due to arbitrary and illegal
grant of licences at the behest of Mr. A. Raja (respondent No. 2) who was appointed as Minister for
Communication and Information Technology on 16.5.2007 by the President on the advice of Dr. Manmohan
Singh (respondent No. 1). After collecting information about the grant of licences, the appellant made detailed
representation dated 29.11.2008 to respondent No. 1 to accord sanction for prosecution of respondent No. 2
for offences under the 1988 Act. In his representation, the appellant pointed out that respondent No. 2 had
allotted new licences in 2G mobile services on `first come, first served' basis to novice telecom companies,
viz., Swan Telecom and Unitech, which was in clear violation of Clause 8 of the Guidelines for United Access
Services Licence issued by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology vide letter
No.10-21/2005-BS.I(Vol.II)/49 dated 14.12.2005 and, 3
thereby, caused loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government. The appellant gave details of the violation
of Clause 8 and pointed out that the two officers, viz., R.J.S. Kushwaha and D. Jha of the Department of
Telecom, who had opposed the showing of undue favour to Swan Telecom, were transferred just before the
grant of licences and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) which had never entered into a roaming
agreement with any operator, was forced to enter into such an agreement with Swan Telecom. The appellant
further pointed out that immediately after acquiring 2G spectrum licences, Swan Telecom and Unitech sold
their stakes to foreign companies, i.e., Etisalat, a telecom operator from UAE and Telenor of Norway
respectively and, thereby, made huge profits at the expense of public revenue. He claimed that by 2G

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Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.

Selvi & Ors. vs State Of Karnataka & Anr.

 on 5 May, 2010
Author: K B I.
Bench: K.G. Balakrishnan, R.V. Raveendran, J.M. Panchal
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004
Smt. Selvi & Ors. ... Appellants Versus
State of Karnataka ...Respondent With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 54 of 2005, 55 of 2005, 56-57 of 2005, 58-59 of 2005, 1199 of 2006, 1471 of 2007, and
Nos.987 & 990 of 2010 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007]
JUDGMENT
K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.
Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007.
1. The legal questions in this batch of criminal appeals relate to the involuntary administration of certain
scientific techniques, namely narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile
(BEAP) test for the 1
purpose of improving investigation efforts in criminal cases. This issue has received considerable attention
since it involves tensions between the desirability of efficient investigation and the preservation of individual
liberties. Ordinarily the judicial task is that of evaluating the rival contentions in order to arrive at a sound
conclusion. However, the present case is not an ordinary dispute between private parties. It raises pertinent
questions about the meaning and scope of fundamental rights which are available to all citizens. Therefore, we
must examine the implications of permitting the use of the impugned techniques in a variety of settings.
2. Objections have been raised in respect of instances where individuals who are the accused, suspects or
witnesses in an investigation have been subjected to these tests without their consent. Such measures have
been defended by citing the importance of extracting information which could help the investigating agencies
to prevent criminal activities in the future as well as in circumstances where it is difficult to gather evidence
through ordinary means. In some of the 2
impugned judgments, reliance has been placed on certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to refer back to the responsibilities placed on citizens to fully co-operate
with investigation agencies. It has also been urged that administering these techniques does not cause any
bodily harm and that the extracted information will be used only for strengthening investigation efforts and
will not be admitted as evidence during the trial stage. The assertion is that improvements in fact-finding
during the investigation stage will consequently help to increase the rate of prosecution as well as the rate of
acquittal. Yet another line of reasoning is that these scientific techniques are a softer alternative to the
regrettable and allegedly widespread use of `third degree methods' by investigators.


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Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner Of

Basheshar Nath vs The Commissioner Of ...

on 19 November, 1958

Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 149, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 528

Income-tax-Evasion of taxation-Case referred to Investigation Commission-Commencement of the Constitution- Settlement of case --Constitutional validity of-Waiver of fundamental right, if permissible-Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 Of 1947), s. 8A- Constitution of

India, Art. 14, Part III.

HEADNOTE:

The two questions for determination in this appeal were, (1) whether a settlement under s. 8A of the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (30 Of 1947) made after the commencement of the Constitution was constitutionally valid and (2) whether the waiver of a fundamental right was permissible under the Constitution. The appellant's case was on July 22, 1948, referred by the Central Government under S. 5(1) of the Act to the Investigation Commission. for investigation and report. The Commission directed the authorised official under s. 6 of the Act to examine the appellant's accounts. He submitted his final report by the end of 1953. The Commission considered the report heard the assessee and came to the conclusion that Rs. 4,47,915 had escaped assessment. Thereupon the appellant on May 20, 1954, applied to the Commission for a settlement of his case under s. 8A of the Act, agreeing to pay Rs. 3,50,000 by way of tax and penalty at the concessional rate. The Commission reported to the Central Government approving of the settlement, the Central Government accepted it and it was recorded by the Commission. The Central Government directed the recovery of the said amount under s. 8A(2) of the Act. The appellant was permitted to make payments by monthly instalments of Rs. 5,000 and the total amount thus paid up to September 8, 1957, aggregated to Rs. 1,28,000. In the meantime the Income Tax Officer issued a certificate and certain properties of the appellant were attached. Relying on the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri,

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 448 and M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247,

the appellant applied to the Commissioner of Income-tax challenging the validity of the settlement made under s. 8A of the Act on the ground that S. 5(1) Of the Act on which it was founded had been declared void by this Court, and claimed that his properties might be released from attachment and the amount paid under the settlement might be refunded to him., On January 29, 1958, the Commissioner of Income Tax sent a reply to the appellant maintaining that the settlement was valid and 529 that the appellant was bound thereunder to pay up the arrears of instalments and requesting him to continue to pay in future. Against this decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax the. appellant came up to the Supreme Court by special leave. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the Act laid down two distinct and separate procedures, one for investigation and the other for settlement and it was the former alone and not the D, latter that was affected by the decisions of this Court. and that the appellant by voluntarily entering into the settlement had waived his fundamental right founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Held (Per Curiam), that both the contentions must fail. It was not correct to say that the Taxation of Income (In- vestigation Commission) Act, 1947, laid down two different procedures, one for investigation and assessment under s. 8(2) of the Act and another for settlement under s. 8A of the Act and assessment in terms of such settlement and that while the decision of this Court in M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Incometax, Madras, declaring s. 5(1) of the Act to be discriminatory and therefore void, affected only the former procedure and not the latter. The Act laid down but one procedure and in entertaining a proposal for settlement as in the investigation itself the Commission exercised the same jurisdiction, and powers and followed the one and the same procedure as laid down by ss. 5, 6 and 7 Of the Act. Since the settlement in the instant case was no exception to that rule, it was covered by the decision and must be held to be violative of Art. 14 Of the Constitution. M. Ct. Muthiah v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, [1955] 2 S.C.R.

1247, applied. The observations made in the majority judgment of this Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of  Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589, must be kept strictly confined to the special facts of that case and had no application to the facts of the present case. Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589, held inapplicable.

Per Das, C. J., and Kapur J.-There could be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Art. 14 Of the Constitution and it was not correct to contend that the appellant had by entering into the settlement under s. 8A of the Act, waived his fundamental right under that Article. Article 14 was founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued all over the civilised world, its language was the language of command and it imposed an obligation on the State of which no person could, by his act or conduct, relieve it. As it was not strictly necessary for the disposal of this case, the question whether any other fundamental right could be waived need not be considered in this connection. Laxamanappa Hanumantappa jamkhandi v. The Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 769; Dewan-Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Moht 67 530 v. The Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R.773; Baburao Narayanrao Sanas v. The Union Of India, [1954] 26 I.T.R. 725; Subedar v. State, A.I.R. 1957 All. 396 and Pakhar Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 294, distinguished and held inapplicable.

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Global Juris Consultant, Tis hazari, Delhi | Global Juris Consultant, Lawyers in Delhi-NCR - Reviews -...

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The role of the lawyer varies significantly across legal jurisdictions, and so it can be treated here in only the most general terms.

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In practice, legal jurisdictions exercise their right to determine who is recognized as being a lawyer; as a result, the meaning of the term "lawyer" may vary from place to place.

In Australia the word "lawyer" is used to refer to both barristers and solicitors (whether in private practice or practising as corporate in-house counsel).

In Canada, the word "lawyer" only refers to individuals who have been called to the bar or have qualified as civil law notaries in the province of Quebec. Common law lawyers in Canada may also be known as "barristers and solicitors", but should not be referred to as "attorneys", since that term has a different meaning in Canadian usage. However, in Quebec, civil law advocates (or avocats in French) often call themselves "attorney" and sometimes "barrister and solicitor".

In England and Wales, "lawyer" is used loosely to refer to a broad variety of law-trained persons. It includes practitioners such as barristers, solicitors, legal executives and licensed conveyancers, ; and people who are involved with the law but do not practise it on behalf of individual clients, such as judges, court clerks, and drafters of legislation.

In India, the term "lawyer" is often colloquially used, but the official term is "advocate" as prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961.

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• Babla @ Dinesh Vs. State of Uttarakhand
• Gurgaon Gramin Bank Vs. Smt. Khazani & ANR.
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1. T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Ors
2. I. C. Golaknath & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Anrs
3. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd., And Others vs The Union Of India
4. Kedar Nath Singh vs State Of Bihar
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Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr

Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr

1. I propose to divide my judgment into eight parts. Part I will deal with Introduction; Part II with
interpretation of Golakhnath case; Part III with the interpretation of the original Article 368, as it existed prior
to its amendment; Part IV with the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act; Part V with
the validity of Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act; Part VI with the validity of
Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act; Part VII with Constitution (Twenty- ninth
Amendment) Act; and Part VIII with conclusions.

2. All the six writ petitions involve common questions as to the validity of the Twenty- fourth, Twenty-fifth
and Twenty-ninth Amendments of the Constitution. I may give a few facts in Writ petition No. 135 of 1970 to
show how the question arises in this petition. Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970 was filed by the petitioner on
March 21, 1970 under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental rights under Articles
25, 26, 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. He prayed that the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,
1963 (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1969 (Act 35 of 1969) be
declared unConstitutional, ultra vires and void. He further prayed for an appropriate writ or order to issue
during the pendency of the petition. This Court issued rule nisi on March 25, 1970.
3. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1971 (Kerala Act No.
25 of 1971) was passed which received the assent of the President on August 7, 1971. The petitioner filed an
application for permission to urge additional grounds and to impugn the Constitutional validity of the Kerala
Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1971 (Kerala Act No. 25 of 1971).
4. In the meantime, the Supreme Court by its judgment dated April 26, 1971 in Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of
Kerala [1972] S.C.C. 364 (Civil Appeals Nos. 143, 203-242, 274 & 309 of 1971). Judgment dated April 26,
1971 upheld the majority judgment of the Kerala High Court in V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala A.I.R.
1971 Kerala 98 whereby certain, sections of the Act were struck down.
5. The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act came into force on November 5, 1971, the Constitution
(Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act came into force on April 20, 1972 and the Constitution (Twenty-ninth
Amendment) Act came into force on June 9, 1972. The effect of the Twenty-ninth Amendment of the
Constitution was that it inserted the following Acts in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution:
65. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (Kerala Act 35 of 1969).
66. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 25 of 1971).
6. The petitioner then moved an application for urging additional grounds and for amendment of the writ
petition in order to challenge the above Constitutional amendments.
7. The Court allowed the application for urging additional grounds and for amendment of the writ petition on
August 10, 1972 and issued notices to the Advocates-General to appear before this Court and take such part in
the proceedings as they may be advised.
8. When the case was placed before the Constitutional bench, it referred this case to a larger bench to
determine the validity of the impugned Constitutional amendments.
9. Similar orders were passed in the other writ petitions.
10. The larger bench was accordingly constituted. It was then felt that it would be necessary to decide whether
I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 was rightly decided or not. However, as I see it, the
question whether Golak Nath's [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 case was rightly decided or not does not matter because
the real issue is different and of much greater importance, the issue being : what is the extent of the amending
power conferred by Article 368 of the Constitution, apart from Article 13(2), on Parliament ?
11. The respondents claim that Parliament can abrogate fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and
expression, freedom to form associations or unions, and freedom of religion. They claim that democracy can
even be replaced and one-party rule established. Indeed, short of repeal of the Constitution, any form of
Government with no freedom to the citizens can be set up by Parliament by exercising its powers under
Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973


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Bachan Singh vs State Of Punjab

Bachan Singh vs State Of Punjab

Bachan Singh vs State Of Punjab on 9 May, 1980
Equivalent citations: AIR 1980 SC 898, 1980 CriLJ 636, 1982 (1) SCALE 713
Author: O B Kailasam
Bench: Y Chandrachud, A Gupta, N Untwalia, P Bhagwati, R Sarkaria
JUDGMENT
(for himself and on behalf of Chandrachud, C. I. and A.C. Gupta and N. L. Untwalia, JJ.) (Majority view)
1. This reference to the Constitution Bench raises a question in regard to the constitutional validity of death
penalty for murder provided in Section 302, Penal Code, and the sentencing procedure embodied in
Sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the CrPC, 1973.
2. The reference has arisen in these circumstances : Bachan Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of
1979, was tried and convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murders of
Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai by the Sessions Judge. The High Court confirmed his death sentence
and dismissed his appeal.
3. Bachan Singh's appeal by special leave, came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court (consisting of
Sarkaria and Kailasam, JJ.). The only question for consideration in the appeal was, whether the facts found by
the courts below would be "special reasons" for awarding, the death sentence as required under Section 354(3)
of the CrPC, 1973.
4. Shri H. K. Puri, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant, Bachan Singh, in Criminal Appeal
No. 273 of 1979, contended that in view of the ratio of Rajendra Prasad v. State of U. P. (1979) 3 SCR 646,
the courts below were not competent to impose the extreme penalty of death on the appellant It was submitted
that neither the circumstance that the appellant was previously convicted for murder and committed these
murders after he had served out the life sentence in the earlier case, nor the fact that these three murders were
extremely heinous and inhuman, constitutes a "special reason" for imposing the death sentence within the
meaning of Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1974. Reliance for this argument was placed on Rajendra Prasad
(ibid) which, according to the counsel, was on facts very similar, if not identical, to that case.
5. Kailasam, J. was of opinion that the majority view in Rajendra Prasad taken by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., who
spoke for himself and D.A. Desai, J., was contrary to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , inter alia, on these aspects:
(i) In Rajendra Prasad, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed:
The main focus of our judgment is on this poignant gap in 'human rights jurisprudence' within the limits of the
Penal Code, impregnated by the Constitution. To put it pithily, a world order voicing the worth of the human
person, a cultural legacy charged with compassion, an interpretative liberation from colonial callousness to
life and liberty, a concern for social justice as setting the rights of individual justice, interest With the
inherited text of the Penal Code to yield the goals desiderated by the Preamble and Articles 14, 19 and 21.

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CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

On the 28th of January, 1950, two days after India became a Sovereign Democratic Republic, the Supreme Court came into being. The inauguration took place in the Chamber of Princes in the Parliament building which also housed India's Parliament, consisting of the Council of States and the House of the People. It was here, in this Chamber of Princes, that the Federal Court of India had sat for 12 years between 1937 and 1950. This was to be the home of the Supreme Court for years that were to follow until the Supreme Court acquired its own present premises.

The inaugural proceedings were simple but impressive. They began at 9.45 a.m. when the Judges of the Federal Court - Chief Justice Harilal J.Kania and Justices Saiyid Fazl Ali, M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Bijan Kumar Mukherjea and S.R.Das - took their seats. In attendance were the Chief Justices of the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Madras, Orissa, Assam, Nagpur, Punjab, Saurashtra, Patiala and the East Punjab States Union, Mysore, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat and Travancore-Cochin. Along with the Attorney General for India, M.C. Setalvad were present the Advocate Generals of Bombay, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, East Punjab, Orissa, Mysore, Hyderabad and Madhya Bharat. Present too, were Prime Minister, other Ministers, Ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of foreign States, a large number of Senior and other Advocates of the Court and other distinguished visitors.

Taking care to ensure that the Rules of the Supreme Court were published and the names of all the Advocates and agents of the Federal Court were brought on the rolls of the Supreme Court, the inaugural proceedings were over and put under part of the record of the Supreme Court.

After its inauguration on January 28, 1950, the Supreme Court commenced its sittings in a part of the Parliament House. The Court moved into the present building in 1958. The building is shaped to project the image of scales of justice. The Central Wing of the building is the Centre Beam of the Scales. In 1979, two New Wings - the East Wing and the West Wing - were added to the complex. In all there are 15 Court Rooms in the various wings of the building. The Chief Justice's Court is the largest of the Courts located in the Centre of the Central Wing.

The original Constitution of 1950 envisaged a Supreme Court with a Chief Justice and 7 puisne Judges - leaving it to Parliament to increase this number. In the early years, all the Judges of the Supreme Court sat together to hear the cases presented before them. As the work of the Court increased and arrears of cases began to cumulate, Parliament increased the number of Judges from 8 in 1950 to 11 in 1956, 14 in 1960, 18 in 1978 and 26 in 1986. As the number of the Judges has increased, they sit in smaller Benches of two and three - coming together in larger Benches of 5 and more only when required to do so or to settle a difference of opinion or controversy.

The Supreme Court of India comprises the Chief Justice and not more than 25 other Judges appointed by the President of India. Supreme Court Judges retire upon attaining the age of 65 years. In order to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court, a person must be a citizen of India and must have been, for atleast five years, a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession, or an Advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession for at least 10 years or he must be, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. Provisions exist for the appointment of a Judge of a High Court as an Ad-hoc Judge of the Supreme Court and for retired Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts to sit and act as Judges of that Court.

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INDIAN JUDICIARY

INDIAN JUDICIARY

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction. Its exclusive original jurisdiction extends to any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States or between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the other or between two or more States, if and insofar as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or of fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. In addition, Article 32 of the Constitution gives an extensive original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in regard to enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari to enforce them. The Supreme Court has been conferred with power to direct transfer of any civil or criminal case from one State High Court to another State High Court or from a Court subordinate to another State High Court. The Supreme Court, if satisfied that cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before it and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and that such questions are substantial questions of general importance, may withdraw a case or cases pending before the High Court or High Courts and dispose of all such cases itself. Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, International Commercial Arbitration can also be initiated in the Supreme Court. 

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked by a certificate granted by the High Court concerned under Article 132(1), 133(1) or 134 of the Constitution in respect of any judgement, decree or final order of a High Court in both civil and criminal cases, involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court in civil matters if the High Court concerned certifies : (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance, and (b) that, in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In criminal cases, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court if the High Court (a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than 10 years, or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than 10 years, or (c) certified that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Parliament is authorised to confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgement, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court.

The Supreme Court has also a very wide appellate jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals in India in as much as it may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India.

The Supreme Court has special advisory jurisdiction in matters which may specifically be referred to it by the President of India under Article 143 of the Constitution. There are provisions for reference or appeal to this Court under Article 317(1) of the Constitution, Section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 7(2) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Section 130-A of the Customs Act, 1962, Section 35-H of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Section 82C of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Advocates Act, 1961, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Customs Act, 1962, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970, Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Election Petitions under Part III of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Act, 1952 are also filed directly in the Supreme Court.

Under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has been vested with power to punish for contempt of Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. In case of contempt other than the contempt referred to in Rule 2, Part-I of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, the Court may take action (a) Suo motu, or (b) on a petition made by Attorney General, or Solicitor General, or (c) on a petition made by any person, and in the case of a criminal contempt with the consent in writing of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

Under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules the Supreme Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review is to be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

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Copyright Act 1957

Copyright Act 1957

2.Interpretation:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "adapatation" means,-
( i ) in relation to a dramatic work, the conversion of the work into a non-dramatic work;
( ii ) in relation to a literary work or an artistic work, the conversion of the work into a dramatic work by way of performance in public or otherwise;
( iii ) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, any abridgement of the work or any version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed wholly or mainly by means of pictures in a form suitable for reproduction in a book, or in a newspaper, magazine or similar per` iodical; and
( iv ) in relation to a musical work, any arrangement or transcription of the work;
(b) "architectural work of art" means any building or structure having an artistic character or design, or any model for such building or structure;
(c) "artistic work" means---
( i ) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality;
(ii) an architectural work of art; and
( iii ) any other work of artistic craftsmanship;
(d) "author" means,-
( i ) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the author of the work;
( ii ) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
( iii ) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the artist;
( iv ) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph;
( v ) in relation to a cinematograph film, the owner of the film at the time of its completion; and
( vi ) in relation to a record, the owner of the original plate from which the record is made, at the time of the making of the plate;
(e) "calendar year" means the year commencing on the 1st day of January;
(f) "cinematograph film" includes the sound track, if any, and "cinematograph" shall be construed as including any work produced by any mechanical instrument or by radio-diffusion

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